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idea that poverty is persistent is itself
persistent. In its earliest versions, the idea
was that poverty is part of the natural order. The book of
Deuteronomy says, “For the poor shall never cease out of
the land” (Deut. 15:11, King James Version). Jesus echoes
this when he says, shortly before his death, “For the poor
always ye have with you; but me ye have not always” (John
12:8, KJV). Modern writers, too, see poverty as persistent,
but not as natural. It strikes them instead as a puzzling
anomaly, since now there is enough wealth to go around.
Contemporary American writers regularly take society
to task over the fact that the U.S. poverty rate has been
essentially the same for forty years, despite significant
increases in the per capita domestic product.
Why do poor people often stay poor? Among the
most important causes are five behaviors or, better, nonbehaviors: not working, not finishing school, not saving
for a rainy day, not moderating alcohol consumption, and
not living within the law. Obviously not all poor people
fail to do these things. But poor people fail to do them
disproportionately. They account for more than their
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share of non-workers, non-school finishers, and so on.
And this contributes to their poverty.
But this just pushes the question of causation back.
Why do poor people fail to do these things to begin with?
At first glance it seems positively irrational of poor people
not to work, not to finish school, and not to moderate
alcohol consumption, since the latter interferes with earning. After all, poor people need money the most. And at
first glance it seems irrational for anyone, rich or poor, not
to save and not to live within the law. For a dollar means
more to someone when he has fewer dollars than when he
has more. So people who smooth consumption over time,
transferring dollars from their relatively rich time slices to
their relatively poor ones, wring more benefit from their
resources than people who let their consumption vary by
failing to save and pursuing risky careers.
I want to persuade you that the main accounts of
poverty get off on the wrong foot because what appears
to be irrational behavior is not; when economic rationality is understood properly, the poverty-linked conduct
emerges as being (in general) straightforwardly rational.
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A Closer Look at the
Inefficiency Argument

To lay the groundwork for my own theory of poverty, I
want to delve more deeply into the conventional argument
that the poverty-prolonging and poverty-worsening conduct of the poor is irrational or inefficient. The inefficiency
argument assumes that the less of a good one consumes,
the greater the satisfaction one gets from a little bit of it.
From this premise it is inferred that for those who have
very little, additional goods—and the effort needed to
get them—should be especially valuable. From the same
premise it is also inferred that smoothing consumption
over time wrings more satisfaction from a given amount
of a good than allowing consumption to vary, for peaks of
consumption must add less satisfaction to the satisfaction
of average consumption than the corresponding valleys
subtract. All this supports the conclusion that poor people
who do not work, do not finish school, do not save, do
not drink moderately, and do not obey the law waste
part of the satisfaction they could derive from their time,
energy, money, and other resources.
The argument is persuasive. Its key propositions—
that goods, and hence work, are especially valuable to
the poor and that consumption smoothing is efficient
for all—will strike many readers as commonsensical. The
theory in which these particular ideas are embedded,
known as marginalism, is the conventional wisdom about
satisfaction-efficient allocation. At its core is the idea that
resources mean most to those who have least. On this
basis it is natural to conclude that poor people stand to
benefit especially from working for pay, staying in school,
and moderating alcohol consumption, and that, like everybody else, they stand to benefit from saving for a rainy day
and living within the law.
I want to contend that the mistake lies in accepting
marginalist criteria of efficiency in the first place. Instead
of talking about whether the conduct does or does not
meet the usual criteria of efficiency, we should be asking
whether the usual criteria are the right criteria. I will try
to persuade you that marginalism itself is mistaken by
presenting reasons to doubt its ultimate premise, the law
of diminishing marginal utility, and reasons to accept an
alternative. On this basis I will give a new argument for
the efficiency of the poverty-linked conduct in question.
Lydian Prudence and Its Premise

I ask you to consider the following passage from
Herodotus’s Histories. In it the fifth century BC historian
describes the practices adopted by the Lydian people of
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Asia Minor in the face of a prolonged famine.
The story is that in the reign of Atys, the son of
Manes, the whole of Lydia suffered from a severe famine.
For a time the people lingered on as patiently as they
could, but later, when there was no improvement, they
began to look for something to alleviate their misery.
Various expedients were devised—for instance, the invention of dice, knuckle-bones, and ballgames. The way they
used these inventions to help them endure their hunger
was to eat and play on alternative days—one day playing
so continuously that they had no time to think of food,
and eating on the next without playing at all. They managed to live like this for eighteen years.
What is significant here? To begin with, like many
poor people today, the Lydians allocated their meager
resources unevenly between time slices of themselves. If
we assume that “severe famine” means a condition in
which luxurious consumption cannot be achieved even by
saving, their pattern must have been “skimp a little, skimp
a lot”—eat no more than enough one day and nothing the next. Further indication of their preference for
uneven consumption is the very fact that what they used
to distract themselves from hunger were games of dice
and similar games.
While uneven consumption is inefficient when judged
by modern criteria of economic efficiency, Herodotus’s
passage gives us reason to wonder whether the Lydians
were not being prudent and sensible after all. For one
thing, their practices resulted from careful thought about
how to minimize misery. Moreover, the passage suggests
that the Lydians’ strategy was sophisticated as well as
deliberate, for they are described as being the inventors of
not only gold and silver coinage but retailing. Third, the
practices continued for eighteen years—surely enough
time for the Lydians to compare the results with those of
smoothing consumption over time.
In short, this passage indicates that at least one
society in the distant past adopted counter marginalist
patterns on the basis of smart, careful thinking, and that
it stuck to them in the light of long experience for reasons
having nothing to do with atypical preferences.
What assumption might the Lydians have made that
would explain their seeing these patterns of consumption as efficient? One possibility is that they assumed
the marginal utility of resources at truly insufficient
levels of consumption is increasing instead of diminishing. In other words, when there is not enough of a good,
equal increases in consumption bring bigger and bigger
amounts of relief. Such an assumption is contrary, of
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course, to the law of diminishing marginal utility, which
hypothesizes diminishing marginal utility at low levels
of consumption as well as high. But suppose the Lydians
were assuming exactly this. It would follow that the benefit of a meager portion is more than twice the benefit of
half of it. Therefore, eating half as much every day as the
Lydians were in fact eating every other day—which is to
say, smoothing consumption—would actually have wasted
potential benefit from the food supply. Imputing this
assumption to the Lydians makes sense of the pattern
they actually adopted.
Furthermore, if marginal utility is increasing at low
levels of consumption, then typical people whose consumption is very low will derive very little utility from a bit
more consumption. This makes sense of another part of the
story. Like many poor people in modem times, it seems
that the famine-oppressed Lydians did little work. Rather,
they played games “continuously” every other day. We are

low levels of consumption and pleasers at high levels
of consumption.
Relievers
Relievers, such as salves, are goods that reduce pain,
unhappiness, or misery. Contrary to the law of diminishing marginal utility, relievers are a major type of good
that exhibits increasing (not diminishing) marginal
benefit. The benefit of relievers—namely, relief—grows
as consumption grows, but the benefit grows faster than
the consumption. Equal increases in the consumption of
relievers produce ever bigger increases in the relief that is
felt by the consumer.
The best evidence of this is common experience. Take
the case of burdens—not in the metaphorical sense but in
the literal sense of heavy things to be hefted and carried.
What then is the marginal benefit of relievers such as help
in bearing the burden? In fact it is increasing. To clarify

constructive option: make the
poverty-reducing behaviors rational instead
of irrational for the people who are poor .

There is a

not told why they did little work. It may have been that
farming, fishing, and hunting were simply not worth the
effort because of the stinginess of nature in that time and
place. But there is another possibility. If marginal utility is
increasing amid true scarcity, then perhaps they did little
work because, having very little food for whatever reason,
marginal increases in their diet were worth little to them,
contrary though this idea may be to the law of diminishing
marginal utility and contemporary common sense.
So we must still ask: does the marginal utility of consumption rise when goods are truly scarce? Or is human
psychology better captured by the law of diminishing
marginal utility, which would have it that even amid scarcity a bit of a good is more satisfying when it is one of few
bits than when it is one of many? You may be scratching
your head at the very idea of increasing marginal utility,
so irresistible has the law of diminishing marginal utility
come to seem. But let us look more closely.
Replacing the Law of Diminishing
Marginal Utility

I begin by distinguishing three types of goods: relievers,
pleasers, and goods that function as relievers at

this, let us imagine two scenarios. In the first, you are
about to walk up a hill empty handed when you are given
five pounds of grain to take with you. The second scenario
is identical to the first, except that just before you are
given the five pounds of grain to carry, you are given fifty
pounds of grain to carry. In other words, the contents of
a five-pound sack are simply added to a fifty-pound sack.
There can be little doubt that in the second scenario, the
five pounds would seem less burdensome than they would
seem in the first scenario.
In fact, you might barely notice those five pounds on
top of the fifty pounds you are already obliged to carry in
this scenario. Probably you would not pay much to have
a helper carry just those five pounds for you since you
would still have to deal with the fifty-pound burden. But
if all but six of the fifty pounds were taken off your hands
unexpectedly, being relieved of the five pounds would be
a greater benefit, since that would make the difference
between a six-pound burden and a one-pound burden.
You would likely pay more to have a helper carry the five
pounds in this case. As this suggests, the benefit of a certain amount of help in bearing a burden is greater when the
burden is less. From here it is a short step to recognizing
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everyday experience, things like desserts
and movies. Students readily agree that
the third helping of dessert brings less
pleasure than the first, and so forth. But
the textbooks do not recognize that significant classes of goods are not pleasers
(or not pleasers at all levels of consumption—see below), and so they claim far
more generality for the law of diminishing marginal utility than they should.

that successive equal lightenings will bring increasing
amounts of subjective relief.
In this case, common experience is confirmed by
science. In 1834 Ernst Weber established experimentally
that a greater absolute change in a stimulus is required to
produce a just noticeable difference in our sensory experience when the stimulus is larger to begin with. Further,
Weber showed that for each type of stimulus, the percentage change in the stimulus that is required to produce a
subjectively perceptible change is a constant fraction.
Moving now from physical to mental relief, we see
the same principle in operation. The first scratch sustained
by a new car distresses its owner. It is hard to look at the
scratch. Each subsequent scratch causes new displeasure,
but as the scratches mount up, the new ones add less and
less new distress. The seventh may elicit nothing more
than an irritated shrug. So the relief that comes from
repairing the very first scratch that the car sustained will
be greater if the other six are also being fixed than if the
other six are not.
Pleasers
These are goods that cause positive experience, as distinct
from removing negative experience. Examples might
include a glass of wine along with a meal or a portion of
ice cream at the end. To lose a pleaser or not to have one
is not an evil but only the undoing or absence of a good.
Unlike relievers, pleasers do generally conform to the
law of diminishing marginal utility. Virtually all introductory economics textbooks remind students of the psychological impact of successive pleasers that are familiar from
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Reliever/Pleasers
The third class of goods, reliever/pleasers,
is the most important for understanding poverty. Reliever/pleasers do not fall
completely into either of the preceding
categories. Rather, they are relievers at
low levels of consumption and pleasers at
high levels of consumption. Examples include many basic
goods—things that benefit virtually all consumers: food,
shelter, clothing, transportation, leisure, and opportunities to take part in community life. Characteristic of these
goods, besides being generally valued, is that they can be
used or consumed at three levels: insufficient levels, where
shortfalls make for misery and more consumption makes
for relief; sufficient levels, which cause neither misery nor
positive pleasure; and above-sufficient levels, where the
consumer takes a positive enjoyment or satisfaction from
consuming them.
The “dual citizenship” of goods of this third type
shows itself in their marginal benefit. They act just like
pure relievers when insufficient amounts are being consumed, which is to say, they yield increasing marginal
benefit. But they act just like pure pleasers when more
than sufficient amounts are being consumed, which is to
say, they yield diminishing marginal benefit. The point is
a central one. To repeat, the marginal benefit of reliever/
pleasers is first rising and then falling. In the insufficient
range (where by definition additional quantities bring
relief ), equal additions to consumption produce bigger
and bigger additional benefits, but in the more-thansufficient range, equal additions produce smaller and
smaller additional benefits.
Consider housing. Suppose we take the perspective
of a couple whose house has a bedroom for them and
one for each of their six children, plus adequate room for
entertaining and other functions besides. Clearly they are
consuming or using housing in the more-than-sufficient
range. Their house is a source of positive experience.

perspectives

As each child leaves for college (let us say), the amount
of space available for the use of the couple goes up by
roughly equal amounts, but probably their enjoyment
of the house goes up by smaller and smaller amounts.
To take a small but representative aspect, the new hobbies that can now be pursued because there are specialized
spaces for them (e.g., sewing, exercise, painting, etc.) will
themselves yield smaller and smaller amounts of additional pleasure, if only because the more there are, the
less attention can be paid to each one.
But now imagine a couple whose dwelling is a
one-bedroom house that is barely adequate for themselves. If a child arrives, then, given the crowded conditions, the couple’s privacy is much reduced, their peace
and quiet is disturbed, and they may have to start sleeping in shifts. Whatever the compensating joys of parenthood may be, there are impressive deteriorations in their
physical comfort. By the time child number six arrives,
the couple may hardly notice the further deterioration
in their situation that occurs as a result. One more loud
voice outside the bedroom door will not make much
difference. One more child in one’s path as one stumbles
to the bathroom at night may not add much misery.
Accordingly, as the children grow up and move out and
space per inhabitant goes up, the first child to leave may
not subtract much discomfort from the couple’s life.
After all, if one more voice outside the bedroom door
did not add much discomfort, one fewer should not subtract much discomfort either. But when the sixth child
finally moves out, undoing the impressive deterioration
created by the first baby, the relief may be enormous.
This story pulls together reminders of common experience to show that while the marginal benefit of housing
space per inhabitant may be diminishing at high levels,
it is rising at low levels.
Toward a Solution of the Puzzles

Generally speaking, then, it is the very rationality of the
poverty-causing behaviors that explains their persistence—
and hence the persistence of individual poverty itself. In
that sense, poverty is a self-sustaining condition, not a selfeliminating one. Here is the grain of truth in the ancient
idea that poverty is natural.
This may seem to be a counsel of despair or at least of
pessimism. But it is not. Natural does not mean ineradicable. There is a constructive option, and that is to make the
poverty-reducing behaviors rational instead of irrational
for the people who are poor. But how? By making them
less poor. The same reasoning that shows that poverty

tends to be self-sustaining shows that rising out of poverty,
too, is a process with its own momentum.
But it matters a lot how the pump is primed. First,
any scheme to make the poor less poor will have a counterproductive impact on motivation if help is made available to those who are not really poor—that is, those who
do not suffer from material shortages in the first place,
including people who underreport their income to game
the system—for the motivation of the recipients will be
reduced, and public mistrust of the system will starve it
of political support.
Second, the best tactic for delivering the assistance
seems to be supplementing market wages through tax
breaks for very low-income wage earners. This program
combines two enticements to work. Like other schemes
for relieving misery, including no-strings handouts, wage
supplements for the poor raise (not lower) the felt value
of the next misery-relieving dollar. Like the dab of salve
that’s given to the man with two stings, it makes the marginal impact of the next dab of salve, the one that assuages
the last sting, greater. But in addition, wage supplements
raise the cost of not working. The greater your net wage,
after all, the more you give up by not going to work. So
it’s a double-barreled antipoverty strategy, not a singlebarreled one like straight handouts. Politically, too, wage
supplements are more palatable than handouts because
wage supplements are justified partly by effort that has
already been expended by the recipient, not just by effort
that is (supposedly) going to be expended as a result of
the assistance. They look reassuringly like a reward and
not a piece of social engineering.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Charles Karelis is a research professor of philosophy
at George Washington University. He was formerly a professor at Williams College, director of the Fund for the
Improvement of Postsecondary Education, and president
of Colgate University. He has a longstanding interest in
public policy and the psychological foundations in microeconomics. Karelis earned his bachelor’s degree from
Williams College in 1966 and his doctorate in philosophy
from Oxford University 1972.
This article is adapted from Karelis’ book titled The
Persistence of Poverty: Why the Economics of the WellOff Can’t Help the Poor, published by Yale University
Press in 2007.
33

